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I) Overview  
The analysis begins with a discussion of the methodology employed along with a general overview and 
justification of the use of the ALC framework. A timeline of fragility in Somalia is then presented along with a 
breakdown of key stakeholders—both internal and external—in the country. Based on the data examined, a 
fragility risk assessment covering six key fragility clusters is presented. Best and worst cases scenarios are then 
examined based on the evidence presented in the risk assessment. The scenarios for the short-term (6-12 
months) are outlined and inform the three policy recommendations that follow. The policy recommendations 
directly address the Authority and Capacity components of the ALC model. 
II) Methodology 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was employed to ensure a robust evidence-based 
analysis of the current situation in Somalia. The primary sources relied upon for data collection include, but are 
not limited to: scholarly articles, reports from government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
indices such as the Fragile States Index (FSI), Freedom House and the World Bank (WB) database. Challenges 
in collecting data revolved around the limited public opinion polls and outdated or incomplete statistics on 
Somalia. To compensate for this limitation, media coverage from both international and local news outlets was 
relied upon for events monitoring and up-to-date information. These various data sources were then triangulated 
to address gaps in information and identify fragility trends in Somalia. Following a risk assessment based on the 
collected data and trend lines, governance and political stability, security and economic development were 
identified as the key clusters to address in Somalia. The Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity (ALC) model was then 
applied to these clusters to determine the areas of focus and provides a sequencing for the proposed policy 
options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary: Despite billions in aid and a series of international interventions, Somalia has 
ranked as the world’s most fragile state for much of the past decade. This raises the question as to what 
is driving fragility within the country and why aid is seemingly ineffective in this context. This report is 
designed to provide the Government of Canada (GC) with an analytical overview of the key drivers of 
fragility in Somalia and proposes targeted initiatives where development aid is more likely to be 
effective. The Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity (ALC) model developed by Carment et al. provides the 
theoretical framework through which the issues in Somalia are analysed. Specifically, it reveals that 
weak governance, weak security institutions and slow economic growth are the key drivers behind 
fragility and undermine ALC. Three policy recommendations are proposed that target these drivers and 
address components of ALC: training of the Somali National Army (SNA), support for the 
federalization process, and agricultural aid. 
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III) Authority- Legitimacy- Capacity (ALC) 
The Authority-Legitimacy-Capacity (ALC) model proposed by 
David Carment, Yiagadeesen Samy and Stewart Prest captures 
both structural features of states and the more intangible measure 
of state-society relations to explain state fragility.1 Earlier 
theories of state fragility tended to ignore the nuances between 
fragile states leading to a one-size fits all policy approach. The 
ALC model disaggregates the necessary components of a 
functioning state and allows policy makers to target specific areas 
of fragility within these areas. It also allows the specific context 
within the country to be taken into consideration in the analysis. 
For instance, one state might lack a monopoly on the use of force 
undermining its authority, whereas another state may be unable to 
provide goods and services to its population impacting its 
capacity. Both states are fragile but require different responses from the international donor community. 
IV) Timeline of Fragility  
 
Somalia is stuck in a fragility trap.i For much of the past decade the country has ranked as the world’s most 
fragile state according to the Fragile States Index—other indices similarly rank Somalia very high.2 While some 
of Somalia’s problems can be traced back to the period of colonial and authoritarian ruleii, the 1991 Somali 
Civil War set the context for many of the issues that continue to plague the country. Pre-existing societal fault-
lines diverged during the civil war and Somali society became deeply fractured along clan lines with inter-clan 
violence continuing to this day along contested regional borders.3 Amidst the chaos, Somaliland declared 
independence in 1991, while a number of other regions, notably Puntland and Jubaland, have since declared 
autonomy.4 [See ANNEX A: Map of Somalia] 
                                               
i Adrihimihaja et al. discuss the seemingly untenable position that states stuck in a fragility trap find themselves ensnared in. Violence, 
poor governance and insecure property rights contribute to extreme state fragility—which are especially evident in Somalia’s case. 
Development aid is often tied to performance, but the aforementioned drivers of fragility hamper a state’s ability to effectively 
demonstrate progress to donor countries. Nora Aina Adrihimihaja, Matthias Cinyabuguma and Shantayanan Devarajan, “Avoiding the 
fragility trap in Africa,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. (2011). 
ii Somalia gained independence in 1960, with the merger of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. Siad Barre’s post-independence 
regime was highly repressive but was supported by the U.S., a product of Cold War realities. 
Capacity
Legitimacy
Authority
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External intervention in Somalia has proven extremely difficult and, at times, counterproductive.iii  In particular, 
the conduct of select Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) personnel during UNOSOM I and IIiv was highly 
questionable and led to a formal public inquiry.v The deteriorating security situation after 1991 has made 
Somalia a high-risk environment for donors.5 The intervention by the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) since 2007 has, for the most part, shifted terrorist group Al-Shabab from its former position as a 
quasi-central authority.6 However, the withdrawal of key contributing states from AMISOM in recent months, 
specifically Ethiopia, has threatened to overturn the fragile gains that have been made.7 In addition, AMISOM 
recently indicated it will be withdrawing forces by 2020 calling into question the future of security in Somalia.8 
 
Despite these challenges, with significant help from the donor community, Somalia established a permanent 
government in 2012—a milestone in a lengthy process to re-establish central authority that began in 2004.9 
President Hasan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate has since expired, after four years in power, and the country was 
scheduled for its first presidential election cycle by the end of 2016 but this has since been postponed. 
V) Key Stakeholders 
 
Internal Stakeholders 
Federal Government of Somalia: President Hasan Sheikh Mohamud ran for office on a platform of national 
unity and reconciliation in an attempt to transcend clan-based politics. Mohamud’s presidential mandate has 
since expired and the international community has insinuated that he may be delaying elections to entrench his 
hold on power.10 Mohamud has countered that the deteriorating security situation and administrative issues have 
required the continued postponement of elections. Mohamud’s cooperation with the democratic process will be 
key for political stability within the country and the continued devolution of power to regional governments. 
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who is running for president in the coming election, hails from 
the Puntland region and has strong ties with the semi-autonomous state. He has successfully negotiated with 
Puntland on behalf of the FGS over contentious issues such as resources sharing, border demarcation, and 
contributions to a national Somali army.11 Sharmarke’s role in establishing the SNA, and his links to regional 
power-players, make him an influential actor in the realm of security sector reform.     
 
Regional Governments: Abdiweli Mohamed Ali is the current President of Puntland. Ali has strong 
international connections, owing to his role negotiating trade deals on behalf of Puntland, and prior to that, the 
Transitional Government of Somalia (TGS).12 Ali is an important stakeholder for garnering support for the 
federalization process and for security reform within the country- given the fact that Puntland maintains its own 
army.13 
Regional government stakeholders that are potentially antagonistic to the FGS include the President of 
Somaliland, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, who will likely view a growth in the authority and capacity of the 
FGS as a threat to the independence of his quasi-state. Ahmed Mohamed Islam, President of Jubaland, an 
Islamist with a history of opposing Western-backed central authority in Somalia is also a potentially 
                                               
iii Peacekeeping missions—the first established by UNISOM in 1992—have had mixed results. U.S. backed intervention by the 
Ethiopian military to counter the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 undermined the legitimacy of the Transitional Government and 
undercut the emergence of a functional Somali economy. In recent years external intervention has had a more positive effect. 
iv UNOSOM I was a United Nations-led mission to provide humanitarian aid in Somalia and monitor the recently brokered cease-fire. 
Following the failure to prevent fighting, the U.S. led an expanded mission, known as UNOSOM II. 
v The institutional fallout of the ‘Somalia Affair’ was swift and comprehensive, resulting in a complete restructuring of training 
received by Canadian troops, and a more stringent vetting-process for officers. 
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antagonistic stakeholder. Islam, despite his reluctance to embrace an expanded FGS, is a key ally in the fight 
against Al-Shabab and keeping him onside is vital if the central government is to effectively combat the 
extremist group. 
 
Clans: Despite its relative ethnic homogeneity, Somalia remains deeply divided along clan lines. There are four 
major clans--the Hawiye, Dir, Darood and Isaaq--and a number of sub-clans. The absence of central authority 
has acted as a catalyst to further entrench the influence of clan leaders who govern over areas using centuries-
old customary law. Clan authority played out in the extreme when, in 1991, members of the Issaq clan broke 
away from Somalia, forming the independent state of Somaliland. In addition, the formation of Puntland was 
created under the guidance of the Darood clan. Despite conciliatory overtures by the FGS, clan leaders in the 
country view politics as a zero-sum game, in which any increase in the authority and capacity of the FGS is 
seen as a direct threat to their power and influence. 
 
Al-Shabab: Al-Shabab is a militia group with ties to Al-Qaeda. The group has an estimated 9,000 soldiers and 
its current leader is Ahmed Umar.14 Al-Shabab’s goal is to overthrow the FGS, expel all foreign forces, and 
govern Somalia and its surrounding areas under Sharia Law.15  As of 2012, the group began employing 
terrorism at an exponential rate, as a means to achieve that goal, targeting internal and external focuses and 
threatening security and stability within the region.16 Their nationalistic ideologies attract the Somali diaspora 
from several regions of the world, including Canada.17 Somalis have, at times, looked to them for protection, 
resources and a source of income.  
 
External Stakeholders 
Diaspora: The diaspora is estimated at just under 2M with significant populations in Yemen, South Africa, the 
U.S and the U.K.18 It has contributed $1.6 billion in remittances to the Somali economy in 2015.19 Furthermore, 
these remittances have contributed to inter-clan warfare by providing funds for munitions, however they have 
also contributed to mediation efforts.20 
  
Neighbouring states: Somalia has a strained relationship with its neighbours who have a key interest in 
ensuring stability within the country and preventing spillover effects. Ethiopia, a key contributing member to 
AMISOM, has begun the withdrawal from Somalia and Uganda recently announced it will be withdrawing by 
December 2017.21 Kenya has absorbed significant costs from instability in Somalia and is home to an estimated 
335,000 Somali refugees.22  
 
Turkey: Turkey has increased its involvement within the country in recent years, both in terms of humanitarian 
assistance and military training.23 Turkey helped in the building of major infrastructure projects within Somalia 
such as airports, hospitals and schools.24 Currently, Turkey is training members of the SNA and they have built 
a military base.25  
VI) Fragility Risk Assessment (6-12 months) 
The analysis focusses on six main clusters which encapsulate key drivers of state fragility: governance and 
political stability, economic development, security, environmental stress, human development and demographic 
pressure. While Somalia ranks poorly along all six clusters, three clusters are identified as areas where the 
donor community can have the greatest impact. A timeframe of 6-12 months is chosen as it allows for more 
accurate presumptions and the ability to make realistic recommendations. Projecting further than 12 months 
may be difficult as the current situation in Somalia is volatile on the ground with the ongoing security situation 
and continual postponement of elections. 
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Governance and political stability is identified as a high risk for stability in Somalia. While the general trend is 
stable, the country still ranks poorly along all indicators of governance and political stability and the potential 
for deterioration would have dire consequences for the functioning of the state. Economic development is a 
moderate risk for stability in the country given the history of resilience in this cluster at the sub-state level. The 
general trend is improving but indicators still rank low. Strengthening progress in this area would have positive 
cascading effects in other clusters of fragility such as human development. Security is a high risk and poses 
challenges for stability in other clusters of fragility such as governance and political stability. The security 
situation has deteriorated in recent months with continued clashes between clans and gains by Al-Shabab. 
 
LEGEND 
Risk LOW MODERATE HIGH 
Condition        Improving             Stable 
                Deteriorating 
 
 
 
Governance and Political Stability  
 
Indicators Description 
Political rights  
(1= best, 7=worst) 
2016: 726  
2015: 727  
2014: 728 
Level of corruption in public sector 
(0= highly corrupt, 100=very clean) 
2015: 8/100, ranked 167/168 countries29 
Rule of law 
(-2.5 to 2.5. Higher values reflect better 
score.)  
2010: -2.4230 
Freedom of expression 
(16= best possible score) 
2016:1/1631 
2015:1/1632 
2014: 1/1633 
Political Pluralism 
(16= best possible score) 
2016: 0/1634 
2015: 0/1635 
2014: 0/1636 
  Assessment 
Somalia ranks poorly along every indicator of governance, as defined by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project.37  For instance, corruption remains endemic in the public sector38, freedom of 
expression is severely curtailed39, and citizens have limited voice in the government.vi Large strides have 
been made in establishing governance institutions and creating political order within the country since the 
                                               
vi In 2012, the President was elected by the legislature which was appointed by 135 Somali elders. The 2016 presidential election was 
supposed to be ‘one person-one vote’, but a system of more representative democracy has been postponed until the 2020 election. 
Freedom House, “Somalia," https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/somalia (Accessed October 13, 2016) 
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2012 inauguration of the FGS.vii However, Somalia still has a long way to go and there are signs that 
progress has plateaued in recent months.40 The FGS announced that the 2016 elections will not be by 
popular vote due to infrastructure constraints and gaps in election legislation, and the constitutional review 
is behind schedule.41 A particularly troubling development concerns the presidential elections, originally 
scheduled for September 2016, which have since been postponed four times, casting doubts as to whether 
there will be a peaceful democratic transition of power.42  
A particular challenge for consolidating democracy in Somalia is that there are no formally recognized 
political parties and politics is largely formed around clan allegiances.viii The ongoing federalization 
process and recent passing of the Political Parties Bill in 2016 is an attempt to move the political system 
away from clan-based politics but it has created tension between elite factions in Somalia over the future 
of the parliamentary model.43 Womenix and minoritiesx also continue to be underrepresented and 
discriminated against in governance institutions. A deterioration of conditions within this cluster poses a 
high risk for stability within the country. 
 
 
Economic Development  
 
Indicators Description 
GDP growth  
2015: GDP= $5.9 Billion for 2015, up from $5.3 billion 
in 2013.44 
Government debt and foreign aid 
2015: ODA= $1.3 billion. Aid has increased in the past 
two years ($1.8B), accounting for more than the total 
aid disbursed from 2005-2012 combined ($1.78B).45 
2015: Government debt= $3 billion.46 
Poverty rate 2012: 73%47 
Youth unemployment rate (14-29 year olds) 2012: 67%48 
  Assessment 
Recent reports show that the economy is growing thanks in part to an expanding private sector, a growth 
in livestock exports, and foreign-backed construction projects in-and-around the capital.49 Economic 
progress is still highly contingent upon a stable security situation and could be derailed by environmental 
                                               
vii For instance, there is now a central authority within the country, a national constitution that codifies human rights principles, and 15 
laws have been passed by Parliament since 2012. United Nations Human Rights Council, Twenty-fourth session, National report 
submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Somalia,  prepared for the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/WG.6/24/SOM/1, 2016. 
viii Parliamentary seats are distributed according to a 4.5 clan based power-sharing formula which provides each of the four major 
clans with 61 delegates and the minority clans with a cumulative total of 31 delegates. 
Freedom House, “Somalia,”  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/somalia 
ix The 2012 constitution outlines that 30% of seats in Parliament are to be held by women; however, only 14% of seats are currently 
occupied by women and the only female presidential candidate recently withdrew her candidacy. Samira Shackle, “Somali woman 
struggle to make it in politics,” Al Jazeera, June 11, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/somali-women-
struggle-make-it-politics-201461171019836712.html (Accessed October 14, 2016.) 
x Minority groups represent up to one-third of the Somali population but are highly discriminated against according to the Minority 
Rights Group. Martin Hill, “No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities,” Minority Rights Group International (UK: 2010): 4. 
http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-912-Click-here-to-download-full-report.pdf (Accessed 
Dec.1, 2016). 
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shocks. Nonetheless, the economy is an area of resilience in Somalia. As the health of the economy is 
deeply connected to others areas of fragility--resilience to environmental shocks, and key human 
development indicators, for example--strengthening the economy remains a key priority for the FGS and 
the donor community. 
The Somali economy, as the result of two decades without a functioning government, is largely 
underdeveloped and non-diverse. The economy is heavily reliant on remittances, sent from the Somali 
diaspora overseas, and aid from donor countries.xi [See ANNEX B: International Aid] Many Somalis, 
particularly in Mogadishu, have adapted to an environment without a job-creating central authority, and 
there have been some encouraging entrepreneurial developments, particularly in telecommunications.50 
This is reflected in GDP growth from $5.3 billion in 2013, to $5.9 billion in 2015; and an uptick in 
income per capita. However, with an income per capita of just $435, Somalia remains the fifth poorest 
country in the world.51 At present the government is unable to extract sufficient tax revenues to build 
capacity and reinvest in goods and services.xii 
Agriculture—both farming and pastoralism—remains the largest segment of the economy with 65-70% 
of Somalis engaging in agriculture of some kind, contributing to close to 60% of Somalia’s GDP.52 
Agricultural production, however, is largely inefficient owing to farming methods which are 
incompatible with current environment conditions. Failed harvests have pushed many Somalis towards 
participation in the illegal charcoal industry. More worrying, Al-Shabab has been able to exploit 
economic anxieties, particularly among young Somalis, in order to bolster recruitment numbers.53  
 
 
Security   
 
Indicators Description 
Military expenditure  $50,985, 000 (2011) 0.9 % of GDP54 
Military strength  20,000 soldiers in the SNA55 
Violent outbreaks 
 469 Terrorism-related incidents in 201456 
Statistics for crime-related violent outbreaks could not 
be verified. 
External military presence  
22,126 AMISOM troops,57 200 Turkish soldiers (in 
Somalia to train troops)58 and 200-300 U.S. Special 
Forces personnel59 
  Assessment 
Security within Somalia has continued to deteriorate, particularly within the past few months, leading to 
a downward trend and high-risk level. The biggest security risk to the country remains extremist groups, 
in particular, Al-Shabab. Somalia ranked eighth on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2015.60  Somalia 
has been in the top-10 most dangerous countries in terms of terrorist activity for the past 8 years.61 
Between 2012 and 2013, the number of people killed by terrorist attacks in Somalia increased by 32%, 
accounting for nearly 3% of the world’s death rate due to terrorist activity. 62 In 2014, 469 incidents of 
                                               
xi Remittances account for over $1.6 billion, with ODA $1.3 billion for 2015 in a GDP of just $6 billion. Federal World Bank Group, 
“Aid flows in Somalia: Analysis of aid flow data,” WB (February 2016): 8. http://new-deal.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Aid-
Flows-in-Somalia-FINAL-WebVersion.pdf (Accessed Nov.23, 2016). 
xii As of June tax revenues for 2016 was $45,544,843, falling significantly short of the original forecast of $107,771,120.  Federal 
Government of Somalia, “Summary of Government Revenue and Expenditure as of June, 2016,”  http://mof.gov.so/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/FiscalSummaryReport-June-2016.pdf (Accessed Dec. 4, 2016). 
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terrorism occurred in the country with an increase in related deaths, making it one of the worst years for 
terrorist activity in Somalia.63 [See ANNEX C] Southern Somalia experiences the most attacks, with 
Mogadishu following suit.64 Furthermore, the illicit flow of arms into the country plays a role in 
destabilizing the security situation.xiii At present Somalia’s army is in its infancy, having recently 
reformed in the last few years after its dissolution in 1991.65 It is currently made up of 20,000 troops,66 
but relies heavily on international security forces to maintain security within the country. The creation of 
a national army is an attempt to create a national institution representative of all the clans, however, the 
inclusion process remains a difficulty.67 Currently, Turkey plans on training 10,000 Somali soldiers to 
aid in the strengthening of the military.68  
 
 
Environmental Stress  
 
Indicators Description 
Flooding 
Flash floods occur annually in Somalia every spring. Impact of flooding 
increasing due to population increase and climate change.69 50,000 people were 
displaced in 2013 as a result of flooding.70 
Droughts 
The East African drought of 2011-12 was considered to be the worst drought in 
60 years. At present, large parts of the country are experiencing a severe 
drought. The FGS and regional leaders have called for humanitarian 
assistance.71 
Farming practices 
1.6 percent of land in Somalia cultivated.72 Bananas and sugarcane two of the 
major cash-crops grown. Maize is the main crop grown for domestic 
consumption, but it is not considered drought-resistant.73 
Assessment 
As environmental and economic issues are deeply interconnected, and the ability to build up resilience to 
environmental shocks depends in large part on a restructuring of the rural economy, our policies will not 
target the environment directly. Somalia, and countries in the Horn of Africa in general, are bearing the 
brunt of climate change.74 Somalis are highly reliant on agriculture—both farming and pastoralism—but 
environmental shocks such as flooding and droughts, events that are increasing in frequency and severity 
owing to climate change, have rendered current agricultural practices unproductive.75 As a result, many 
Somalis have made the decision to participate in the illegal charcoal industry which funds militia groups 
and Al-Shabab, undermining state authority.76 The charcoal industry, which involves cutting down and 
burning acacia trees in large quantities, exacerbates environmental degradation through deforestation and 
desertification. This has a negative impact upon the livelihoods of farmers and pastoralists and makes 
Somalia more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.  
 
 
Human Development  
 
Indicators Description 
Life expectancy  52.4 years (Male: 52.3; Female: 54.5). Ranks 218th in the world.77 
                                               
xiii The FGS has limited ability to track weapons in areas outside of the capital and government sanctioned weapons have been found 
on the black market. “Measuring Illicit Arm Flows: Somalia” Small Arms Survey. Number 61 (October 2016): 1. 
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Infant mortality 96.6 death per 1000 live births. (3rd highest in the world)78 
Child malnourishment  
 12.5 percent of child under 5 years old considered chronically 
malnourished.79 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
28% of 14-17 years old enrolled in secondary school.80  
Assessment 
Somalia has weak institutions which are unable to effectively monitor and record indicators of human 
development. In 2013, the central agencies within Somalia set together a plan to achieve universal basic 
health care by 2016, however, the state continues to have health care challenges and an undeveloped 
healthcare sector.81 Somalia is making progress working with UN agencies such as WHO, UNICEF and 
UNFPA82 thus our policies will not target health directly. In November 2016, the Somali government 
launched the first draft of the National Development Plan in 30 years demonstrating a commitment to 
addressing sustainable development challenges within the country.xiv Furthermore, Somalia has 
extremely low enrolment rates for primary school ages children. Currently, only 42% of children are 
enrolled in school with the majority being girls.83  
 
 
Demographic Pressure          
 
Indicators Description 
Population ages 0-14 (% 
of total) 
2015: 47% 84 
2010: 45%85 
Refugees As of 2016, there are over 1M internally displaced persons in Somalia, an 
estimated 11,000 refugees in the country and over 11,000 asylum seekers.86 
Fertility rate 
(birth/woman) 
2014: 6.587 While fertility rate (births/woman) is high, it has seen a steady 
decline since 1997.88 
Population flight/ 
migration of labour 
force 
According to a 2012 UNDP report, 60% of youth in Somalia have intentions 
of leaving.89 
Assessment 
Demographic concerns are seen to pose a moderate risk to stability within the country given their impact 
on other clusters such as the economy, security and human development. The two major demographic 
concerns in Somalia are the repatriation of Somali refugees from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and 
the youth bulge in the country. While the repatriation process began in December 2014, the UNHCR 
accelerated the process this past year to meet the Kenyan government’s original plan to close the camp 
by November 2016.90 The Kenyan government has since softened its deadline; however, as of September 
2016, the number of repatriated Somali refugees reached 30, 731.91 The lack of adequate resources in 
place for the return of Somali refugees coupled with high unemployment heightens the risk that refugees 
will be recruited into militia groups, such as Al-Shabab. Somalia is also experiencing a significant youth 
bulge with 47% of the population between the ages of 0-14.92 This is problematic when coupled with the 
                                               
xiv The NDP’s first objective is to address poverty by investing in economic sectors such as farming, livestock and fishing. Federal 
Government of Somalia, “Somalia launches first National Development Plan in 30 years,” Nov.3, 2016  
http://mopic.gov.so/2016/11/03/somalia-launches-first-national-development-plan-in-30-years/ 
(Accessed Nov.12, 2016). 
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low employment rate, high poverty and low education which make youth vulnerable to recruitment from 
extremist groups in Somalia and may fuel further civil unrest. 
VII) Theoretical Approach: ALC 
The ALC model is applied to the identified risk clusters to determine the areas of focus for engagement and the 
appropriate sequencing approach. Somalia ranks poorly along all three dimensions of ALC but it is argued that 
authority and capacity should be targeted directly, with the assumption that legitimacy will improve with 
progress in these two dimensions.  
 
Authority: Authority is measured as the ability of the state to provide security and exercise control within its 
territory.93 In Somalia, divisions between clans and tensions between the FGS and the autonomous regions 
within the country have undermined the ability of the central government to enact binding legislation and 
establish effective control. In addition, the FGS has itself been the subject of political infighting between the 
President and Prime Minister.xv Somalia’s overall progression in re-establishing authority has been encouraging, 
particularly when one takes into account that the country is emerging from total state collapse. Nonetheless, the 
worsening security situation in recent months, characterized by the resurgence of Al-Shabab and withdrawal of 
Ethiopian forces, has led to a deterioration of the government’s ability to provide security to the population and 
exercise effective control over the country.94 
 
Legitimacy: Legitimacy is defined as the population’s allegiance to the state and focusses on state-society 
relations.95 Legitimacy within Somalia is assumed to be low due to poor representation of minorities in the 
governance structures and the limited reach of the FGS in the outer regions of the state. Deep-seated distrust of 
central authority, fomented in the antebellum period, and entrenched during the civil war, permeates Somali 
society.96 The legitimacy of the Somali regime has deteriorated further within recent months with the 
postponement of the presidential and legislative elections.97 The upcoming elections also highlight that the 
government has fallen behind on a number of key milestones that would ensure greater representation of the 
population in governance institutions. 
 
Capacity: Capacity is the potential for the state to respond and provide resources to the population.98 The 
absence of a functional state government in Somalia for 20 years has decimated the capacity of the country. The 
FGS, with significant support from the international community, has had to rebuild and re-establish the key 
institutions and infrastructure needed for the country to function. Human development indicators in Somalia are 
among the lowest in the world and the FGS is highly dependent on international aid and remittances to provide 
services.99 Revenues from personal income tax have consistently underperformed and tax arrangements with the 
business community have not yet materialized, undermining the capacity of the government to provide 
services.100 In addition, the limited capacity of the FGS makes the country more vulnerable to demographic and 
environmental pressures.  
  
Key drivers of fragility: It becomes clear from the overview of challenges in Somalia that weak governance 
institutions and weak security institutions are key drivers of fragility and negatively impact authority and 
legitimacy. Poor economic performance, amplified by weak governance and security institutions, also 
contributes to the ongoing fragility trap and undermines the capacity of the state.  
                                               
xv In December 2014, a no-confidence vote was passed against Prime Minister Abdiweli Skeikh Ahmed. He served for just under a 
year after his predecessor was voted out of cabinet for ‘poor performance’ and disagreement over the cabinet composition. Freedom 
House, “Somalia,” Freedom House, 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/somalia (Accessed Oct.13, 2016). 
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VIII) Scenarios 
The following are best case and worst case scenarios based on an improvement or deterioration in the risk 
clusters over the next 6-12 months. It serves as a framework for the preceding policy options.  
 
Best-case: Federal and legislative elections are not widely contested and there is limited violence and 
intimidation at the polls. The federalization process continues to be implemented and regional governments 
include representation of women and minorities. The Dadaab refugee camp remains open until relative stability 
can be achieved in Somalia, reducing demographic pressures. The capacity of the SNA is enhanced with 
training by international forces and territorial gains are made against Al-Shabab. The economic situation 
improves with the creation of new job opportunities through federal arrangements and the FGS is able to deliver 
basic services to its population. 
 
Worst-case: Elections are widely contested leading to an outbreak of violence and a further fracturing of 
political and social divisions. Continued gains by Al-Shabab threaten security and reinforce the notion that the 
FGS is unable to maintain a monopoly on the use of force.101 The repatriation of Somali refugees from the 
Dadaab refugee camp is resumed placing added pressure on the weak infrastructure in the country and leads to 
increased resentment by the regional governments towards the centre. Prolonged droughts and flooding within 
the country impact the agricultural industry, increasing food insecurity and worsening poverty.102 
IX) Policy Options  
The following policy options target the key drivers of fragility in Somalia and directly address weaknesses in 
authority and capacity. The proposed policies are designed to prevent the worst-case scenario. Measures of 
success are broken down according to immediate, intermediate and long-term objectives over the span of two 
years. [See ANNEX D: Measures of Success] 
 
A.               Training for the Somali National Army (SNA) 
Policy: It is proposed that the GC take a role in military reform as a means of stabilizing conditions on the 
ground and providing an environment conducive for the FGS to effectively fulfil basic governance roles for its 
population. It is recommended that the GC, through the Department of National Defense (DND), train the 
military in counter-insurgency techniques to make national forces more effective in battling Al-Shabab and 
other extremist groups that are threatening the stability of the state. Canada could also assist the SNA in 
integrating former militia groups in the security sector as a way of building a truly national institution that cuts 
across clan divisions and exercises its authority without raising alarm and being viewed as a coercive tool 
against certain clans. 
 
Relevance for recipient: In addition to the continued attacks from Al-Shabab, there have been clashes on the 
borders between the regional states.103 The violence has worked to undermine the authority, and by extension, 
the capacity and legitimacy of the central government. For the FGS to narrow the capacity gap—to provide 
basic goods and services to its people—the security situation on the ground must be conducive to such goals.xvi 
                                               
xvi Such an understanding is consistent with a Weberian notion of state authority, as deriving from an ability to monopolize the use of 
force within a given territory. D. Lambach, E. Johais and M. Bayer, “Conceptualizing State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach,” 
Third World Quarterly. 38(7): 2015. 1299-1315.  
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Currently, Somalia is in the process of reforming its army. According to a public opinion poll conducted in 
Mogadishu, 46% of interviewees viewed security as a priority policy issue for the FGS.104 
 
Relevance for donor: In 2016, Canada furthered its interests in Somalia and the SSR process through 
recommendations to the UN, stating that the army’s training should ensure it complies with “international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, including by integrating human rights training into 
security sector reform programs”.105 Canada’s involvement in training the SNA would allow for direct 
monitoring to ensure it is being delivered in a way that respects these values. Canada also has experience 
providing training to international armies in both fragile and conflict affected states. Currently, the Canadian 
Armed Forces (CAF) are engaged in operations in several African countries, namely, Mali, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.106  
 
Access Points: The primary entry point is the SNA, under the direction of the FGS. It is important for Canada to 
complement, re-enforce, and enhance, the existing security reforms that are currently being carried out by other 
states in the country, rather than duplicating efforts. For instance, Turkey, a NATO ally, is currently building a 
military base and training the SNA.107 Canada can also work in conjunction with AMISOM to train the Somali 
military.  
 
Consequences of Actions and Stakeholder Analysis: The primary stakeholders of this policy is the general 
population of Somalia and the SNA. The secondary stakeholders are the neighboring states and those with a 
military presence in Somalia, such as Ethiopian and Kenyan forces. Turkey’s involvement within the country 
and its creation of a military base may complicate efforts if they view Canada as acting against their interests. In 
addition, it is important that Canada’s role in military training does not simply focus on counterinsurgency, but 
also on helping the SNA build ties with the general population. It is essential that extrajudicial killings, arbitrary 
arrest and the mistreatment of the civilian population are not normalized and institutionalized, but viewed as the 
antithesis to building a stable security environment. Despite the intention to emphasize respect for human rights 
within the military, enlarging state authority comes with the inherent risk that the state will use such authority as 
a means to coerce the population in order to entrench its privileged position within society. This would 
undermine state legitimacy overtime and counteract the aim of shrinking the authority and capacity gaps. 
Furthermore, autonomous regions and the breakaway province of Somaliland may perceive the strengthening of 
state authority as a threat to their autonomy and could react violently as a means of preserving said autonomy. 
To mitigate this, one may work on encouraging discussions and meetings with Somaliland to ensure the SNA’s 
intentions to dilute Al-Shabab’s influence on the region are clear. 
 
B.                   Support for the Federal System 
Policy: It is proposed that the GC, through Global Affairs Canada (GAC), provide technical assistance and 
funding to the UNDP’s Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) project. This project is mandated until 
March 31, 2018 to provide support to the federalization process in Somalia through several key outputs: 
enhancing political dialogue and consultations, strengthening the capacity of the FGS to implement the federal 
process, providing support to the federal state administrations and strengthening public sector capacity, and 
ensuring civil society engagement with federal states.xvii 
                                               
 
xvii The project supports Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal (PSG) 1: Inclusive Politics, PSG 5: Revenue and Services and 
Sustainable Development Goal 16 to promote peace, justice and strong institutions.  United Nations Development Programme, 
“Support to emerging federal states,” UNDP, 
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Relevance for recipient: The Provisional Constitution established in 2012 marked the start of the federalization 
process in Somalia.108 The New Deal Somali Compact and Vision 2016 reaffirmed the FGS’s commitment to 
implement a federal system to promote more inclusive politics.xviii In 2015, public opinion polls conducted in 
Somalia found that the majority of participants supported a federal arrangement and viewed a centralized 
unitary state as oppressive.xix Nonetheless, the implementation of the federal system has proven to be a 
contentious process and a potential trigger for further conflict within the country.xx The next stage in the 
federalization process is to ensure that the newly established federal state governments are inclusive of women 
and minorities, understand their relationship with the central government and maintain the authority and 
capacity within their regions to administer services to the population. In addition, a federal system would help 
to address some of the ALC challenges facing the FGS. For instance, the devolution of power could assist in 
bolstering the legitimacy of the government by creating stronger state-society relations and ensuring greater 
representation of marginalized groups.xxi The implementation of an effective federal system also has the 
potential to enhance the capacity of the government to provide basic services to the population and increase its 
ability to establish voter districts and a tax collection system. Finally, a federal system will assist in establishing 
the government’s authority in areas that have historically been outside the reach of the FGS. 
 
Relevance for Donor: Canada has a long standing history of promoting good governance and democracy 
abroad.109 A key focus for the GC’s international agenda in 2016-17 is “to advance inclusive and accountable 
governance.110  In addition, a thematic priority for Canada’s international development assistance is advancing 
democracy, with a focus on strengthening institutions and ensuring gender equality.111 Canada has also 
partnered with the African Union (AU) in the past to support political reforms in African countries and helped 
to establish the AU’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.112 The proposed policy is in 
line with Canada’s past and present engagement in the region and draws upon the GC’s expertise and skills in 
this thematic area. 
 
Access Points: The Ministry of the Interior and Federal Affairs (MOIFA) is charged with overseeing the 
federalization process and could serve as a point of contact. To avoid duplication of efforts and leverage 
resources, it is recommended that Canada partner with an existing organization that is established in the region 
and engaged in the federalization process. Specifically, the UNDP has been operating the StEFS project in 
Somalia since 2015 and is a well-known and respected organization that could benefit from additional support. 
  
                                               
http://www.so.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/docs/Project_Documents/CrossCutting/StEFS%20Emerging%20States%20ProDoc%20
1%20April%202016%20to%2031%20Dec%202017.pdf (Accessed Nov.15, 2016). 
xviii For instance, Article 3 affirms that the country is founded upon the principles of power sharing and Article 48 allows for 
devolution of power to the Federal Member States Level. 
Federal Republic of Somalia, “Provisional Constitution,” FGS, 
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=RkJTOSpoMME= (Accessed Nov.20, 2016), 13. 
xix According to a 2015 public opinion poll conducted by Data Grid Somalia in central Somalia, 53.3% of those polled supported a 
federal arrangement. Data Grid Somalia, 8. 
xx For instance, the semi-autonomous region of Puntland severed ties with the FGS in 2014 over plans to divide the region into 
separate federal states. Mohammed Yusuf, “Puntland cuts ties with Somalia over formation of new state,” VOANews, August 12, 
2014. http://www.voanews.com/a/puntland-cuts-ties-with-somalia-over-formation-of-new-state/2410930.html
 
 (Accessed Nov.19, 
2016).
  
 
xxi The nascent federal states encompass various clan territories which will force leaders to appeal to their constituencies beyond clan 
based politics. 
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Consequences of Action and Stakeholder Analysis: The primary stakeholders for this policy are the general 
Somali population, the FGS, regional governments, clans and Al-Shabab. The devolution of power could pose a 
threat to national unity if federal state actors view themselves as operating separately or against the central 
government. Clans that have de-facto governed the regions for the past 20 years are likely to view the 
establishment of formal administrations as a threat to their power base and may act as spoilers in the process. 
There is also a risk that the new administrations will simply formalize and solidify clan power relations within 
communities, rather than establishing a more representative governance structure. In addition, it likely that Al-
Shabab will view the increased reach of the FGS as a threat to its survival and target the new administrations 
and leaders. While the demarcation of state boundaries is largely finalized, tensions could resurface as more 
permanent administrations are established and legislation is enacted.xxii To the extent possible, efforts should be 
made to ensure these risks are taken into consideration in policy planning and mitigated during implementation.  
 
C.   Agricultural Aid 
 
Policy: It is proposed that the GC offer non-technical aid, through GAC, in the form of funding for use in 
purchasing equipment for agricultural activities—and funding for UN-run projects already underway in rural 
Somalia. It is also proposed that the GC extend technical aid, in the form of training Somali farmers in the use of 
more efficient methods of agriculture. Such training would entail assisting farmers with the planting of drought-
resistant crops such a millet and sorghum, assistance in the development of efficient water catchment techniques 
and sustainable land management practices. 
 
 Relevance for Recipient: Approximately 70 percent of Somalis are engaged in growing crops or raising 
livestock, earnings derived from which contribute to around 60 percent of GDP.113 One in five harvests is said to 
be a partial failure, however, and as a result 70 percent of Somalis are considered to be undernourished.114 Rural 
Somalis are often out of the reach of the central government whose development focus has largely centered on 
infrastructure in and around the capital, Mogadishu. Targeting aid towards the agricultural sector would help 
diminish the severity of fragility in the economy and environment clusters--clusters which interact in a highly 
combustible manner. A lack of economic opportunities incentivises participation in illegal activities such as the 
charcoal trade which diminishes environmental resilience and undermines the authority and capacity of the 
FGS.115 In addition, increasing the economic wellbeing of rural Somalis, would go some way towards building a 
viable tax base, thereby building the capacity of the FGS to provide goods and services. 
 
Relevance for Donor: Agricultural initiatives are in the line with Canada’s international development aid 
thematic priorities, including increasing food security, stimulating economic growth and increasing 
environmental sustainability.116 Canada is currently involved in agriculture projects in Tanzania, Kenya and 
India among others, drawing on the Canadian International Food Security Research Fund (CIFSRF).117 
Agricultural reform is relatively inexpensive to enact and pays dividends greatly in excess of the initial financial 
and time-related investment. 
 
Access Points: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) is active on the ground, engaged in 
projects which include water catchment techniques and the mechanization of Somali agriculture.118 Canada 
could work within the existing FAO framework and complement projects currently underway. There are also 
local NGOs active in farming communities, such as the Somali Agricultural Technology Group (SATG) who 
                                               
xxii This is a particular risk given tensions between Somaliland and the FGS and contested areas between Puntland and Somaliland. 
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have worked with local farmers on projects such as soil enrichment.119 The SATG have an intimate knowledge 
of local conditions, which would be of immense value to Canadian advisors on the ground. 
 
Consequences of Action and Stakeholder Analysis: The primary stakeholders are the general Somali 
population, the FGS and Al-Shabab. Canadian involvement in agricultural reform could contribute to a two-
tiered system within rural Somalia. While it is anticipated that knowledge transfer between Somalis would 
compensate for an inability to reach every part of the country in the long-term; in the short-term, this policy 
could have the unintended effect of increasing inequality within and between regions. Such a divide could 
exacerbate pre-existing tensions and resentments in what is still a highly fractured country. Secondly, Somalis 
who do adopt new agricultural could become easily identifiable targets for militia groups looking to spoil the 
process of reform. Improvements to everyday life which will result from agricultural reform directly threatens 
the sustainability of Al-Shabab by diminishing its potential recruitment pool. Al-Shabab also benefits immensely 
from the charcoal trade. Making agriculture more productive and profitable would help steer Somalis away from 
the trade, but it could increase the level of violence from Al-Shabab in the short-term as they look to protect a 
key revenue stream. 
X) Conclusion  
This paper has provided the GC with an analytical overview of the key drivers of fragility in Somalia for the 
purpose of developing effective policy recommendations to assist Somalia in exiting its fragility trap. The ALC 
model reveals that weak governance, weak security institutions and slow economic growth are the main drivers 
of fragility. Weak state authority manifests itself through underdeveloped security institutions and the limited 
reach of the federal government outside of the capital. The limited ability of the government to provide services 
is a reflection of poor capacity. In turn, poor capacity combined with a deteriorating security situation negatively 
impacts the legitimacy of the central government. Authority and capacity are targeted directly in the proposed 
policies, with the assumption that legitimacy will improve with progress in these two dimensions. The three 
policies: Training for the Somali National Army, Support for the Federal System, and Agricultural Aid, are 
intended to address the identified weaknesses.   
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ANNEX D 
 
Measures of Success 
 
 
I) Training the SNA 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II) Support for the federalization process 
Ultimate Outcome  (2+ years)                             
Effective and self-sufficient 
military force able to provide 
stability and security to 
population 
Intermediate 
Outcome                
(12-24 months)
Increased skills and 
knowledge of counter-
insurgency techniques, 
in accordance with 
human rights principles
Strengthened military 
able to respond to 
crises situations and 
conduct counter-
insurgency 
Immediate 
Outcome         
(6-12 months)
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III) Agricultural Aid 
 
Ultimate outcome (2+ years)  Strengthened regional 
governance institutions representative of Somali society
Intermediate outcome (12-24 months)
Immediate 
outcome              
(6-12 months)
Increased 
knowledge of 
federalism by civil 
society 
Strengthened 
government 
engagement with 
civil society on 
topics of 
federalism
Improved 
organizational 
capacity of 
regional 
governments to 
represent their 
constituencies
Increased 
knowledge of 
federalism 
structures by 
regional 
governments
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Intermediate outcome (12-24 months)
Immediate 
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sustainable 
farming practices 
Enhanced capacity 
to engage in 
sustainable 
farming practices
Provision of 
drought resistant 
crops 
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